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ELECTION SLAPPS: EFFECTIVE AT SUPPRESSING
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GIVING ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTES THE SLIP
Leah McGowan Kelly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Allowing the states to set finicky rules for ballot access in presidential
elections places a special burden on independent candidates. Most states have
established an intricate network of rules and procedures that independent
candidates need to follow in order to get on the state’s ballot for the presidential
election. If a candidate manages to make it onto a state’s ballot, most states also
have a mechanism that allows almost anyone to challenge the process the candidate
went through to get on the ballot. Citizens can challenge the candidate’s
nomination petition, and then appeal the decision on the challenge at several
different levels. An independent candidate running for national office can become
embroiled in simultaneous petition challenges, and appeals, throughout the country.
The process consumes a candidate’s precious resources during a critical time in the
campaign. Nominees of the major parties do not face this potential labyrinth of
litigation.
A SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) is a lawsuit that
typically has no merit, but is filed to prevent the defendant from participating in a
political process.1 The nuance and variance of nomination petition requirements,
combined with the availability of private challenges to the petitions, lay fertile
ground for Election SLAPPs. In the mid-1990’s, many states enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes.2 These statutes are intended to curb the effects of SLAPPS.3 Anti-SLAPP
statutes provide a vehicle for early dismissal of frivolous suits that appear to have
been filed for collateral political purposes.
When Ralph Nader ran for President in 2004, his political rivals forced his
campaign to defend against 29 complaints, in 19 different jurisdictions, in the
months leading up to the election.4 He faced Election SLAPPs. The complaints
had no merit, and were filed to stifle his political participation. The majority of the
complaints challenged his nomination petitions in various states, and five of the
complaints alleged violations of campaign finance laws.5 Nader defeated most of
the challenges to his nomination petition, and all of the challenges to his
compliance with campaign finance laws, but his challengers succeeded in diverting
* J.D., 2007, University of Michigan Law School. The Author would like to thank her family,
especially her husband, Michael Kelly, and her parents, Mark and Ann McGowan, for their support
through the development of this article. The Author would also like to thank Professor Don Herzog for
his guidance and encouragement. Finally, the Author would like to thank the staff of the Maine Law
Review for their feedback and careful edits.
1. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 3
(1996).
2. See id. at 189.
3. See id.
4. See Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692, 695, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
5. See id. at 695.
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his campaign resources and thwarting his efforts to get on the ballot in some states.
When the dust of the 2004 race settled, Nader tried to litigate back. Eight years and
two presidential elections after the shenanigans that gave rise to them, Ralph
Nader’s lawsuits over the use of coordinated, nation-wide ballot challenges to
sabotage his 2004 Presidential campaign have finally been dismissed – without a
hearing on the merits.6 Despite years of litigation in various jurisdictions, the
alleged conspiracy to drain Nader’s campaign by filing frivolous lawsuits has
escaped judicial examination, let alone judicial sanction, and, ironically, has
received protection from Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute.
A review of the coordinated, scattershot litigation launched against Nader in
the 2004 presidential election shows how petition challenges, and appeals of those
challenges, stifle the political participation of independent candidates in
presidential elections, without advancing the state interest of maintaining the
sanctity of the ballot. The success of these Election SLAPPs, which are usually
only filed against candidates who have actually gathered the requisite support to
compile a valid nomination petition, shows that states should eliminate the
availability of private challenges to nomination petitions. In practice, the private
challenge mechanism does not operate to enforce a state’s nomination petition
requirements. Instead, the mechanism is used as a weapon against viable
candidates who have actually gathered enough legitimate support to threaten an
opponent. Allowing private challenges to nomination petitions invites a political
rival to sabotage an opponent’s campaign by filing frivolous challenges.
An examination of Nader’s efforts to seek judicial redress for the alleged
misuse of the judicial system raises the issue of the utility of Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute. When Nader brought suit against those who had coordinated the frivolous
lawsuits, his tormentors actually used Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss his
case. So, a statute designed to minimize the impact of SLAPPs has been
repurposed to protect those who file SLAPPs. Nader’s struggle as a litigant
seeking redress in the courts for the onslaught of frivolous litigation shows how
some anti-SLAPP statutes, like Maine’s, have been used to shelter the litigants they
were designed to stymie.
This Article begins by outlining the hurdles an independent candidate needs to
clear in order to appear on a state’s ballot. Then, using Nader’s 2004 campaign
experience as an example, it demonstrates how the availability of private
challenges to nomination petitions exponentially compounds the burden of initial
compliance, without any accompanying benefit to the political process or
advancement of any state interest. Next, this Article argues the futility of seeking
legal redress for Election SLAPPs, using Nader’s attempts to do so as an
illustration. The procedural history of Nader’s case in Maine also provides an
example of how some litigants have used Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss
the suits that followed in the wake of their own frivolous lawsuits. The Article
concludes by arguing that 1) Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute should not be interpreted

6. See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51, 66 A.3d 571 (2013); Nader v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 590 F. Supp. 2d 164
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 09-7004, 2009 WL 4250599 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
30, 2009).
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to allow a singular nonfrivolous petition challenge to protect frivolous petition
challenges in the same filing from sanction; 2) Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute should
be applied without either of the burden-shifting mechanisms imposed by the courts
construing it; and 3) states should eliminate the availability of private challenges to
nomination petitions.
II. ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT
A. The Requirements for Nomination Petitions Vary from State to State
Let’s start with a run-through of the process an independent candidate needs to
go through in order to appear on a state’s ballot. Article II of the Constitution
provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors” who shall select the President of the United
States.7 State legislatures pass laws and then election administrators, usually
through a board of elections or a secretary of state’s office, apply the laws and
establish the regulations that determine how a candidate qualifies to be on a state’s
general election ballot as a presidential candidate.8 Generally, a candidate may
appear on a state’s ballot in two ways. A party that has already established a place
on the state ballot may nominate the candidate, or the candidate can satisfy the
state’s signature requirements for ballot access. Currently, every state and the
District of Columbia have their own requirements for gathering and submitting
signatures.9
So, a presidential candidate who has not been nominated by a party with a
ballot line must comply with the signature requirements of each state and the
District of Columbia. Each state establishes the number of signatures that a
presidential candidate must collect in order to appear on the ballot. This number is
variously based on the state’s population of registered voters, the state’s overall
population, the number of people who actually voted in the last presidential
election, the number of people who actually voted in the last election for Governor,
or a set number that is not directly tied to any of the above. The number should
relate to the state’s goal of requiring candidates to show that they have some
legitimate public support and merit ballot placement.10
The quantity of required valid signatures, both in number and in relation to the
population of the state, varies tremendously between states – from as few as 1,000
signatures in Mississippi to 1% of registered voters in California.11 States have
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
8. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Democrats’ Legal Challenges Impede Nader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/19/politics/campaign/19nader.html.
9. See id.
10. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983).
11. New Jersey requires at least 2% of the entire vote case for members of the General Assembly at
the last preceding election; Mississippi requires, 1,000; Iowa, 1,500; Minnesota and Wisconsin require
2,000. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5 (West 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-785(1) (West 2013);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 45.1(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.08(3)(a) (West 2013); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 8.20(4) (West 2013). North Carolina requires 2% of the total number of voters who voted in the
most recent general election for Governor. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-122 (West 2013).
California requires 1% of its registered voters at the time of the close of registration prior to the
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also set different standards for who may sign a petition. In Texas, for example,
someone who has voted in the state’s primary election may not sign a third-party
candidate’s petition for the general election.12 An independent candidate cannot
start collecting signatures in Texas until after the presidential primaries, and the
required signatures must be submitted no later than the second Monday in May.13
In 2008, these rules required an independent candidate, who had to collect
signatures from 1% of the number of people who voted in the last presidential
election, to collect 64,076 valid signatures from those who did not vote in the
primaries, in sixty days.14
Each state also makes rules concerning who may circulate signature petitions.
In 2004, approximately 20% of the states, including California, New Jersey, New
York, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C.,
required circulators of petitions to be registered voters.15 Some states require the
circulator to be eligible to vote in the state where the circulator is collecting
signatures.16 Arizona does not allow ex-felons to circulate petitions, even if they
are registered to vote.17 Arizona also requires circulators to swear that they live in
a particular county, and to fill in their county of residence in a circulator affidavit
that is notarized on each petition.18 In D.C., the circulators must complete an
affidavit wherein they swear that they are registered, qualified electors in D.C., that
they personally circulated the petition sheets, that they witnessed the signing of
each signature, and that they have determined from each signer that he or she is
duly registered to vote in D.C.19
Each state sets standards for the form of the petition, and for the information
required from each person signing the petition. As to the form of the petition, some
preceding general election, which in 2004 was 156,252 signatures. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8400 (West
2013); Report of Registration, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 3, 2004), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
ror/ror-pages/60day-presgen-04/hist-reg-stats.pdf. Texas requires an independent candidate to collect
1% of the number of people who voted in the last presidential election. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §
192.032(d) (West 2013). Wyoming requires 2% of the votes cast in the last presidential election, which
in 2004 was 4,916 valid signatures. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-304(a) (West 2013); Wyoming Voter
Registration and Voter Turnout Statistics, WYO. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://soswy.state.wy.us/
Elections/Docs/profile.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). To add color to this number, according to the
2010 U.S. Census, Cheyenne, the state capital and most populated place in the state, has only 59,466
people within its boundaries. See Cheyenne (city), Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56/5613900.html. Oklahoma requires 3% of the votes cast in the
last presidential election. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 10-101.1(1) (West 2013). In 2004 this
number amounted to 29,275. See General Election, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD (Nov. 2, 2004),
http://www.ok.gov/elections/The_Archives/Election_Results/2004_Election_Results/General_Election_
2004.html.
12. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 192.032(f), (g) (West 2013). In reality, the person can and may
sign such a petition. Such a signature provides a ground for a potential petition challenge. If
challenged, the signature will later be struck.
13. See id. § 192.032(c), (g).
14. See THERESA AMATO, GRAND ILLUSION: THE MYTH OF VOTER CHOICE IN A TWO-PARTY
TYRANNY 37 (2009).
15. Id. at 32–33.
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-315(B)(2) (2013).
17. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 33.
18. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-265(H) (2013).
19. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.08(b)(2)–(3) (2013).
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states provide an actual petition or a sample petition, some do not. Some states
allow candidates to photocopy forms to circulate; others require that the candidates
obtain an original form from the state. According to Theresa Amato, Nader’s
campaign manager for the 2000 and 2004 elections, the campaign “had to beg
Hawaii in writing for additional petitions, as they would ration them, costing [the
campaign] crucial days and lost opportunities to collect signatures.”20 California
accepts petitions on paper of any size; Maine provides candidates with petitions
that are on pink, 11” x 17” paper.21 In Ohio, each petition must bear a photocopy
of the candidate’s signature.22
States also differ with their requirements concerning a candidate’s affiliation
with a particular party. In some states, candidates who are a member of a political
party may not run as an independent. When faced with this restriction in Delaware
and Oregon, the Nader campaign handled vice-presidential candidate Peter Miguel
Camejo’s membership in the Green Party by obtaining the Independent Party’s line
(in Delaware) and by offering a “stand-in” vice-presidential candidate (in
Oregon).23 In some states, a candidate must simply designate a party on the
signature petitions.
In some states, the vice-presidential candidate “must appear” on the petition; in
others, the vice-presidential candidate “may” appear on the petition. Issues may
arise regarding the validity of petitions listing stand-in vice presidential candidates
that were circulated before the presidential candidate named the vice-presidential
candidate, or before there was a nominating convention to select a vice-presidential
candidate.24 According to Amato, “[m]ost states don’t say anything about this
issue in their laws; some states specifically prohibit this substitution and refuse to
substitute other candidates.”25
In Illinois and Pennsylvania, the names and addresses of each of a candidate’s
electors must appear on the signature petitions.26 In Pennsylvania and Maine, a
candidate’s electors must be registered as independent by a certain date.27 In
Nebraska, the electors must be from every congressional district in the state.28
Idaho requires the electors to have lived in the state consecutively for two years.29
Missouri requires notarized elector declarations of candidacy.30
Each state sets a date for when a candidate may begin collecting signatures,
and a date by which the signatures need to be collected and submitted;31 the
20. AMATO, supra note 14, at 30.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 31.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 31–32.
25. Id. at 31.
26. See id. at 32.
27. See id.
28. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1038, 32-620(1), amended by 2013 Neb. Legis. Serv. 349
(West 2012).
29. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-606(2) (West 2013).
30. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 32.
31. In Florida, an independent candidate for president must collect signatures from 1% of registered
electors by July 15 of each presidential election year; the petitions must be certified by county, one sheet
per county, with a fee of 10 cents per signature. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.021(3), 99.097(4) (West
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deadlines range from May to September.32 In addition to raw number quotas, some
states require a certain number of signatures per congressional district. New
Hampshire, for example, requires 1,500 valid signatures from each of its two
congressional districts.33 Virginia requires at least 400 valid signatures from each
congressional district.34
Once a campaign masters each state’s requirements, achieving the signature
quota requires collecting up to double or triple the requisite amount to account for
inevitable errors. According to Amato, circulators face a considerable challenge in
discerning whether they are collecting a signature from a registered voter. “Most
people don’t walk around with a voter registration card in their pocket, and it might
insult even those who do to ask them to flip it out to prove to the circulator that
they are indeed registered.”35 Or, “some people think they are registered to vote,
or are ashamed that they are not, but will tell you that they are and sign your
petition.36 Further, “[o]ther people have moved since they last voted or registered
to vote, which in some states means that they are no longer registered, often
unbeknownst to them.”37 Additionally, “[s]ome people who [are] registered to vote
sign the address of where they currently live, instead of where they are registered to
vote, thinking it doesn’t matter; but it does.”38 Errors may also result from typos or
misspellings.39 Finally, according to Amato, “there are the people who sign
‘Mickey Mouse’ or ‘Donald Duck’ or the name of [the] candidate; or the people
who will walk off with your clipboard because they are hostile to your
candidate.”40 Although collecting double or triple the number of required
signatures may insure collecting the required amount of valid signatures, some
states also limit the number of signatures a candidate may submit.41
When it comes time to submit the petitions, the states have different
requirements for binding or stapling the petitions, and for numbering or not
numbering certain petition pages.42 Deadlines for submission differ by day, by
time of day, and by whether the submission should be made once, or on a rolling

2013). In 2004, an independent candidate would have been required to collect 93,024 valid signatures
by July 15, 2004. See County Voter Registration by Party, FLA. DIV. OF ELECTIONS (2002),
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/pdf/2002/2002genparty.pdf.
32. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 28-29.
33. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:42 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-543 (West 2013).
35. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 34.
36. See id. at 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id. According to Amato, in 2004, a third party or independent candidate had approximately six
and a half months to collect 634,727 valid signatures across the United States. Id. This broke down to
collecting almost 4,000 valid signatures a day. Id. Amato states that a third-party or independent
campaign really had to collect 8,000 to 12,000 signatures a day, to insure against signatures from
unregistered voters, a state’s imperfect voter registration records, and the inevitable lawsuits and
challenges faced by serious candidates. Id.
41. Maine requires 4,000 valid signatures and only allows a candidate to submit 6,000 signatures.
See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(5)(A) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
42. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 38.
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basis.43
In states such as Massachusetts, Maine, and North Carolina, where circulators had
to carry a separate petition for each town, city, or county, those petitions must be
hand delivered, or mailed and received, in each and every town, city, or county
where there are signatories to the petitions – thus necessitating, in some states like
44
Massachusetts, delivery to over one hundred or more turn-in locations.

North Carolina requires independent candidates to validate petition signatures first
with the chairman of the Board of Elections of the county in which the signatures
were obtained, and then validate the signatures with the State Board of Electors.45
In short, obtaining ballot access through nomination petitions requires
compliance with innumerable and varying regulations.46 Failure to comply with
these tedious and fine-grained regulations means not getting on the ballot.
Campaigns have to spend endless time, energy, and money figuring out what the
requirements in each state are and complying with them.
B. Nomination Petitions are Open to Private Challenges
Although the requirements for a valid nomination petition differ from state to
state, most states make a candidate’s nomination petition open to private
challenges.47 This means that a virtually unlimited number of people may subject a
candidate to the burden of defending a petition challenge during the campaign
period.
The nuance and variance of petition requirements from state to state lay fertile
ground for petition challenges. The high volume of required signatures, the
compressed time within which signatures may be gathered, the specific
requirements for circulators, the requirements for the form of the petition itself, the
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 163-122(a)(2); 163-182.4(b) (West 2013).
46. The variation itself is hard to justify in a national election. Most states establish one set of
nomination petition requirements for independent candidates. The requirements apply to independent
candidates who plan to run for a state office, or for president of the country. When the state legislature
determines whether the burden of complying with the nomination petition requirements is unduly
burdensome, one wonders whether the burden is examined solely in the context of a candidate running
for state office, or whether the analysis accounts for a candidate planning to run for national office, who
is also trying to comply with the different requirements of all the other territories, at roughly the same
time.
47. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.552(2) (West 2013); 21-A M.R.S.A. § 356(2) (2008
& Supp. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-351(A) (2013). In some states, like Illinois, nomination
petition signatures are accepted unless they are challenged. See Delay v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 726
N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that state law does not authorize election officials to
challenge nomination papers sua sponte). Under the Illinois system, it seems that only the petitions of
serious candidates would receive challenges, while the petitions of nonserious candidates would not
trigger any concern or challenge. Allowing private parties, as opposed to a government agency, to
challenge a petition leads to uneven enforcement of ballot access requirements. A candidate serious
enough to siphon significant votes from one of the two major parties would predictably face more
challenges than a less serious candidate or a candidate that drew support evenly from both parties. This
distortion does not serve a state’s interest in avoiding voter confusion or keeping nonserious candidates
off of the ballot. See Robert Yablon, Validation Procedures and the Burden of Ballot Access
Regulations, 115 YALE L.J. 1833, 1840-41 (2006).
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restrictions concerning who may sign a petition, the fact that restrictions on these
factors vary from state to state, and the variable of interacting with the public at
large make it likely that the determined challenger will find a way to assert some
instance of noncompliance. Even if a candidate complies perfectly with the
nomination petition requirements of a particular state, the determined opponent can
always bring a challenge over the propriety of the state-imposed requirements that
the candidate actually followed, which happened to the 2004 Nader Campaign in
Maine.48
The petition requirements also lend themselves to sabotage by an opponent.
An opponent could plant faulty or fraudulent signatures on a petition in order to lay
a foundation for a later petition challenge. Considering the intricate and various
regulations of each state’s ballot restrictions, and the aspects of the signature
gathering process that are outside a candidate’s control, it is hard to imagine a
“baseless” challenge to a signature petition.
III. PRIVATE CHALLENGES TO NOMINATION PETITIONS
COMPOUND THE BURDEN FACING INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES
WITHOUT ADVANCING ANY STATE INTEREST
Nader’s experience with Election SLAPPs shows how the availability of
private challenges to nomination petitions exponentially compounds the initial
burden of compliance with each state’s petition requirements, without serving the
state interest of keeping unqualified candidates off the ballot.
A. Nader and the 2000 Presidential Election
In the presidential election of 2000, runner-up Al Gore received more popular
votes than winning candidate George W. Bush.49 Bush won the 2000 presidential
election with 271 electoral votes to Gore’s 266 electoral votes. Disappointed
democrats blamed this election result on Nader, who drew 2.74% of the popular
vote and is said to have drawn critical votes away from Gore, the Democratic
Party’s candidate.50 In the final weeks of the campaign, in fact, Republican
Leadership Council ran pro-Nader ads in a few states in an effort to split the liberal
vote.51 For its part, the Gore campaign advertised the similarities between Gore
and Nader and pressed the fact that Gore had a better chance of winning than
Nader.52 In the aftermath of the close race, many viewed Nader as the “spoiler” of
the 2000 presidential election.

48. In Maine, the Maine Democratic Party challenged the validity of the petition forms provided to
independent candidates by Maine’s Secretary of State. See discussion infra Part III.C.
49. See 2000 Presidential Popular Vote Summary, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (2001),
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/prespop.htm.
50. Id.
51. Laura Meckler, GOP Group to Air Pro-Nader TV Ads, WASH POST, Oct. 17, 2000, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20001027/aponline115918_000.htm.
52. See Katharine Q. Seelye, The Campaign: The Vice President; Barnstorming Nader Turf, Gore
Draws 30,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/27/us/the2000-campaign-the-vice-president-barnstorming-nader-turf-gore-draws-30000.html.
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B. Nader and the 2004 Presidential Election
In 2004, Nader ran for president again. This time, he faced nearly 30
simultaneous complaints against his candidacy, in forums across the country.53 No
such actions were filed against him in the 2000 election. Nader alleges that the
Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) and its affiliates orchestrated the
complaints. Nader’s campaign faced complaints in 18 different state courts
concerning ballot eligibility, and five complaints before the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) concerning alleged violations of campaign finance laws.54
Typically, the challenges to the nomination petitions would start with a state
administrative hearing, followed by multiple appeals to state or federal courts.55
The complaints lodged with the FEC required a response from the Campaign
(within 15 days) and compliance with the FEC as it investigated the complaints.56
The Campaign faced these complaints in the campaign period between June and
September of 2004.57
On the merits, the Campaign “won” 23 of the 29 complaints filed against it.58
The FEC dismissed all of the complaints filed against the Campaign, though not
until April 2006.59 Nader ultimately appeared on the ballot in 13 of the 18 states in
which his nomination petitions were challenged. The ballot access challenges
succeeded in four states – Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, preventing
Nader from appearing on the general election ballot in these states.60 After
withdrawing his nomination papers in response to a challenge, and failing to
prevail on his subsequent challenge to Arizona’s filing deadline, Nader also did not
appear on the Arizona ballot.61 In some states, like Maine, where the Maine
Democratic Party filed two complaints, the Campaign prevailed in every
administrative and court challenge to its nomination papers, until the appeals
processes were exhausted.62
According to Nader, the challenges were frivolous, and brought by the DNC
53. Brief of Appellant at 2, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, 41 A.3d 551.
54. The Campaign’s signature petitions were challenged in: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Complaint at 19-43, In the Matter of the
Democratic Party Ballot Access Litigation Against the Nader-Camejo 2004 Presidential Campaign. In
some of these states, the Campaign faced more than one complaint. Id. Twelve of these eighteen states
were decided by five or fewer percentage points in the 2000 presidential election. See Joshua Green, In
Search of the Elusive Swing Voter, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 102, 103.
55. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III.C.
56. FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
Filing
a
Complaint
(June
2008),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/complain.shtml#timeframes.
57. Complaint ¶ 4, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super. Ct., Was.
Cnty., Nov. 15, 2010).
58. See Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining that
eighteen out of twenty-four complaints made in state court were dismissed, in addition to five FEC
complaints).
59. The FEC dismissed one of the challenges on February 10, 2005, three of the challenges on June
23, 2005, and the last challenge on April 21, 2006. See Complaint ¶ 134, Nader, WASSC-CV-2009-57
(Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cnty., Nov. 15, 2010).
60. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 122.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 129.
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and its affiliates for the collateral purpose of draining the Campaign of money and
other resources.63 The DNC didn’t coordinate nation-wide ballot challenges
because they thought that Nader had failed to gather enough support to qualify to
appear on the ballot in each state. Instead, the DNC coordinated nation-wide ballot
challenges because it perceived Nader as a serious political contender who
threatened to siphon votes away from the democratic candidate. The DNC did not
use the ballot challenge process for its intended purpose of keeping unsupported
candidates off of the ballot. Instead, the DNC used the process to eliminate a
candidate because he was actually supported.
Nader alleges that certain officials of the DNC preemptively declared, even
before Nader announced his 2004 candidacy, that they would challenge his ballot
eligibility.64 Nader also alleges that the DNC funded and coordinated the
nationwide challenges.65 Toby Moffett, a former Connecticut congressman and
president of the Ballot Project, told the New York Times that he and former
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman were trying to “drain [Nader] of resources and
force him to spend his time and money.”66 Moffett was also quoted by the New
Mexican in late July 2004 as saying that “[w]e’re going to make [Nader] spend
time, money, resources.”67
The DNC’s coordination of petition challenges made perverse use of the
petition-challenging processes available in every state. The aggregate burden of
responding to 18 different state petition challenges creates a hurdle to ballot access
that even candidates with the adequate prerequisite voter support may not clear.
The DNC aggregated a series of processes aimed at eliminating non-serious
candidates from a state ballot in order to eliminate a serious candidate for national
office.
Although the challengers “lost” the overwhelming majority of the complaints
filed, the challengers achieved their intended goal. The Campaign lost substantial
money and other resources defending the lawsuits during a critical time in the
campaign cycle. As Moffett told the Washington Post in August 2004, “[w]e
wanted to neutralize [Nader’s] campaign by forcing him to spend money and
resources defending these things, but much to our astonishment we’ve actually
been more successful than we thought we’d be in stopping him from getting on at
all.”68 The lawsuits diverted resources that would have otherwise been spent
gaining ballot access in the unchallenged states.69 As a result of losing ballot
access in some states in 2004, the Campaign was also unable to establish a ballot
line in those states for 2008.70 After the 2004 election, Moffett reported to The
Guardian UK, that “[w]e distracted [Nader] and drained him of resources. I’d be

63. Brief of Appellant at 2, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, 41 A.3d 551.
64. See Complaint ¶ 29, Nader, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cnty., Nov. 25, 2009).
65. See id. ¶ 38.
66. Katharine Q. Seelye, Convictions Intact, Nader Soldiers On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A14.
67. Steve Terrell, Fears of Nader Keep Dems on Offensive, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, July 29,
2004, at A-4.
68. Jonathan Finer & Brian Faler, Nader Still Unsure of Ballot Spot in Many States, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 2004, at A.09.
69. Complaint ¶ 136, Nader, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cnty., Nov. 15, 2010).
70. Id. ¶ 137.
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less than honest if I said it was all about the law. It was about stopping Bush from
The coordinated, nation-wide lawsuits succeeded in
getting elected.”71
marginalizing the Campaign’s efforts to fully participate in the 2004 presidential
election.
Nader garnered fewer votes in 2004 than he had in 2000.72 He appeared on the
ballot as an independent candidate in 34 states and received 465,650 votes, for 0.38
% of the popular vote.73 Bush won another election. John Kerry, the DNC’s 2004
candidate, came in second. Nader finished third. The challengers lost most of their
lawsuits, succeeded in disabling the Campaign, but did not achieve their ultimate
goal of winning the presidential race for Kerry. The challengers did not serve any
state interest in keeping an unqualified candidate off of the ballot, as, in most cases,
Nader had met the petition requirements in the first instance and ultimately
appeared on the ballot.
C. Challenges to the Campaign’s Petition in Maine
The petition challenges in Maine provide an example of the litigation faced by
the Campaign in 18 different states. At heart, the Maine challenges were based on
a typo, the Campaign’s use of the petition forms provided by the Secretary of State,
and the defendant’s assertion (unsupported by statute or practice) that qualifications
for electors should also apply to candidates. Although appealed to exhaustion, the
Maine challenges failed at every level.
A nearly painful level of detail is required to relay the quality of the initial
challenges to Nader’s nomination petitions in Maine, and the baseless nature of the
exhaustive appeals. The following admittedly-dense-with-detail explanation takes
the reader into the thickets of ballot access laws in Maine, but provides only a taste
of the litigation faced by the Campaign in a 12-week period, across the country.
The details of the Campaign’s experience in Maine provide insight into the
effectiveness of Election SLAPPs, and the thickets of Maine’s ballot access laws
show why this area of law is such fertile ground for them.
1. Nomination Petition Requirements in Maine
Maine requires an independent candidate to designate four electors, for
Maine’s four electoral votes, and to name the electors on the signature petitions.74
The signature petitions that are circulated are technically on behalf of these
electors.75 The slate of presidential electors is necessary to get the names of
independent candidates, who run as unenrolled candidates in Maine, on the ballot
for the November election.76 The legal and practical effect of the Secretary of
State’s acceptance of the signature petitions is to include the independent
71. Julian Borger, Fasten Your Seatbelts, GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 2004, at 6.
72. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S.
PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (May 2005), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf.
73. Id.
74. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(1)(B) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
75. See id. §§ 351-355, 801.
76. See id.
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candidate(s) on the November ballot, though technically the votes are cast for the
slate of electors supporting these candidates.77 If successful, these electors would
then act as proxies for the candidates in casting their ballots as part of the Electoral
College.78
Each elector must be a resident of and a registered voter in the electoral
division the elector seeks to represent.79 Each elector must sign and file a
candidate’s consent form, on which the elector declares his or her place of
residence, states that he or she will accept the nomination, states that he or she has
not been enrolled in a party qualified to hold a primary election after March 1st of
the election year, and states that he or she meets the other qualifications to be an
elector, as set forth in section 21-A M.R.S.A. § 352.80 A municipal registrar in
each of the towns where the electors reside and are registered to vote must also
certify that the elector was not enrolled in a qualified party after March 1st of the
election year, and that the elector had not applied to change his or her enrollment
status on or after January 1st of the election year.81
So, the nomination petitions are technically for a slate of four presidential
elector-candidates. Maine requires a campaign to submit 4,000 valid signatures,
but restricts a campaign to submitting 6,000 signatures to satisfy this requirement.82
The nomination petitions are due by August 1st of each election year.83 They must
consist of: 1) “Non-Party Nomination Petition” forms containing signatures of at
least 4,000 registered voters, certified by the registrars of numerous municipalities;
and 2) four “Non-Party Presidential Elector Consent and Certification of
Unenrollment” forms completed by each of the four presidential elector-candidates,
and by the registrars in each of their respective municipalities of residence.84 The
Secretary of State’s office designs both of these forms and provides them to those
seeking nomination by petition.85
Nader’s campaign used the forms provided by the Secretary of State. It
submitted the signatures to the registrar of the municipality, and then refiled the
signatures with the Secretary of State. Maine’s Secretary of State then determined
that Nader’s campaign had filed 4,128 valid signatures – enough to satisfy the
statutory requirement.86
Two challenges followed immediately after the
77. See id.
Although the presidential electors are the candidates seeking nomination by petition,
pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 351-355, their names do not appear on the ballot. Instead,
the names of the persons running for President and Vice President appear on the ballot,
and a vote for them is deemed to be a vote for the presidential electors named in the
nomination petition.
Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 1, n.1, Melanson v. Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, 2004 ME 127, 861
A.2d 641. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
78. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 801 (2008).
79. See id. § 352.
80. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 355(1), (3) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
81. See id. § 353.
82. See id. § 354(5)(A).
83. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354.8-A (Supp. 2012).
84. See 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 351-355 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
85. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 1, Melanson v. Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, 2004 ME 127,
861 A.2d 641. See also 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 351-355.
86. See AMATO, supra note 14, at 124.
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Secretary’s determination.
2. The DNC’s Challenges Failed at Every Level
Dorothy Melanson, the head of the Democratic Party in Maine, challenged the
signature petitions on six grounds:87
(1) use of a fictitious presidential elector in violation of state statute;
(2) failure by candidates to file consent forms in violation of state statute;
(3) failure by candidates to unenroll as required by state statute;
(4) failure to certify electors’ status as unenrolled “on the petition”;
(5) false affirmations by circulators in violation of state statute;
(6) erroneous acceptance by officials of incorrect or missing address information
88
in violation of state statute.

The challenges triggered a hearing before a Secretary of State departmental
Hearing Officer, which was scheduled for August 30, 2004. The hearing lasted two
days and included the presentation of legal arguments and testimony from
approximately twelve witnesses.89 The Hearing Officer issued a recommendation
to the Secretary of State on September 2, 2004.90 The Hearing Officer
recommended rejecting all of the challenges to the nomination petitions.91 The
challengers had an opportunity to file objections with the Secretary of State, which
Melanson did, by September 3, 2004.92 Upon review of the recommendation, the
objections, and the record of the hearing, the Secretary of State adopted the
Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation in a decision dated September 8,
2004.93
The first challenge concerned the birth name of one of Nader’s presidential
electors, “Joseph Noble Snowdeal.” Mr. Snowdeal, however, “has been known
exclusively in his community as ‘J. Noble Snowdeal.’”94 Mr. Snowdeal’s consent
form and two of the 479 petitions accurately identified him as “J. Noble
Snowdeal,” but the remaining petitions identified him as “John Noble Snowdeal.”95
Melanson argued for invalidation of the petitions that identified Nader’s elector as
“John,” instead of “J.” or “Joseph.” On this basis, she claimed that Nader was
87. Another individual, Benjamin Tucker, filed a challenge and participated through counsel in the
administrative hearing held by the Secretary of State. He did not file a petition for judicial review of the
Secretary of State’s rejection of his challenge. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 2, Melanson, 2004
ME 127, 861 A.2d 641. According to Nader, Tucker, a registered Democrat in Maine, prepared and
filed his challenge at the direction of and in cooperation with the DNC, Ballot Project, Kerry-Edwards
2004 and others. Complaint ¶¶ 57–58, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me.
Super. Ct., Was. Cnty., Nov. 15, 2010).
88. See Brief of Appellees at 4, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, 41 A.3d 551. See also
Melanson v. Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, 2004 WL 3196784, at *1 (Me. Super. Sept. 27, 2004), aff’d,
2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641; AMATO, supra note 14, at 124–25.
89. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 2, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641. See also
AMATO, supra note 14, at 124.
90. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 2, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
91. See Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *1.
92. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 2, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
93. Id.
94. Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *2.
95. Id.
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using a fictitious presidential elector.96
The Hearing Officer found that “. . . the name ‘John Noble Snowdeal’ does not
represent a fictitious person, but instead is an incorrect statement of a real elector’s
first name.”97 The Hearing Officer suggested that “the unique combination of
middle and last name would make it unlikely that anyone reviewing the petition
would be misled.”98 The Hearing Officer also pointed out that Melanson had
presented no evidence of anyone actually being misled, and no evidence to rebut
the explanation that the incorrect first name was an honest mistake.99
The Hearing Officer also rejected Melanson’s second and third challenges, that
Nader and Camejo failed to file consent forms and unenroll, because these
challenges were premised on a misunderstanding of Maine’s statute.100 Maine’s
statute requires that “[a] person who seeks nomination by petition” must file a
consent form and an enrollment form if enrolled in a party, but neither Nader nor
Camejo were seeking nomination through the petition signatures.101 As discussed
above, technically, the campaign’s presidential electors were seeking nomination
through the petitions. The consent and unenrollment requirements only apply to
the presidential electors, not to the actual presidential candidates.102
In her fourth challenge, Melanson argued that the signature petition forms,
designed by the Secretary of State, did not ask for all of the information required by
Maine’s election statutes, on each page.103 Melanson argued that the Secretary of
State therefore erred by certifying Nader’s petitions, which utilized this form. Her
argument was based on 21-A M.R.S.A. § 353, which states that:
A person who seeks nomination by petition qualifies by filing a nomination
petition and consent as provided in section 354 and 355. If enrolled, the person
must also withdraw enrollment in a party on or before March 1st to be eligible to
file a petition as a candidate in that election year, as provided in section 145. The
registrar, or clerk at the request or upon the absence of the registrar, in the
104
candidate’s municipality of residence must certify to that fact on the petition.

Melanson argued that the two separate forms – one for signatures, and one for
the elector’s consent and certification of unenrollment, meant that the necessary
information was not all on the same petition. Melanson’s reading of the statute
required all of the required information to be contained on every signature page.
She argued that with two separate forms, the certifications were not on the face of
the petition.105
The Secretary of State argued that the forms, submitted together, constituted
the petition.106 The Secretary of State pointed out its authority, under the general
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *2 (quoting the Hearing Officer).
Id.
See id.
Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3.
21-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (2008 & Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
See Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3.
Id.
21-A M.R.S.A. § 353 (emphasis added).
Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3.
See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 9, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
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election statutes, to establish the forms necessary to carry out elections. The
Secretary of State also pointed out that the consent and certification of
unenrollment forms for all four electors, as well as the names and addresses of all
four electors, which also needed to be included on the petition, would take up over
half of a page and leave little room on the form for signatures.107 The Secretary of
State also argued that this additional information would serve no purpose because
the election statutes don’t even require this information to be added to the petition
until after registered voters have added their signatures. The additional information
on the forms would not even inform those signing the petition because it would be,
or could be, added to the form after signatures were collected. The Secretary of
State argued that using a separate form should not run afoul of the statute.108
On this issue as well, the Hearing Officer agreed with the Secretary of State.
The Hearing Officer acknowledged the Secretary of State’s authority under 21-A
M.R.S.A. § 21 to “establish the form and content of all forms, lists, documents and
records required by or necessary to the efficient operation of” Maine elections.109
The Hearing Officer also looked to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354, which states that
nomination petitions “shall be on a form provided by the Secretary of State,” and
“a nomination petition may contain as many separate papers as necessary.”110 The
Hearing Officer also explained that practical considerations warranted the use of
two separate forms for the nomination petitions.111 As it stood, each petition
needed to include the circulators’ verification statements and the registrar’s
certification of voters’ signatures, because these certifications related solely to the
particular signatures appearing in each petition form.112 To add a registrar’s
certification of unenrollment for each of the four electors, in addition to the
circulator’s verification and the registrar’s certification as to individual voters,
would leave little space for signatures.113 The Hearing Officer also stated that even
though there are two forms, the Secretary of State considers both forms to be part
of the nomination petition, and both forms have to be completed and filed in order
for the nomination to be accepted.114 Finally, the Hearing Officer pointed out that
putting the certifications of unenrollment for all four presidential electors on the
face of the petitions would not inform voters. Because the certificates of
unenrollment do not need to be completed before voters sign the petitions, this
portion of the petition would most likely be blank when voters were actually asked
to sign the form.115
The Hearing Officer also recommended rejecting the remaining challenges
concerning false affirmations by circulators and acceptance of incorrect or missing
address information.116 The Hearing Officer provided numerous and solid grounds
107. Id. at 8.
108. See Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *3.
109. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 21 (2008).
110. Id. § 354. See also Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 8, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
111. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 8, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
112. See id. at 8.
113. See id. at 9.
114. See id.; see also 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 353, 354, 355 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
115. See Brief of Respondent/Appellee at 9, Melanson, 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
116. See Melanson v. Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, 2004 WL 3196784, at *1 (Me. Super. Sept. 27,
2004), aff’d 2004 ME 127, 861 A.2d 641.
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for rejecting Melanson’s challenges, and, as mentioned above, the Secretary of
State accepted the Hearing Officer’s recommendation.117
Nonetheless, Melanson appealed the Secretary of State’s decision concerning
her first four challenges, arguing that the Secretary of State had abused its
discretion in adopting the Hearing Officer’s Recommendation. Melanson’s appeal
went to the Superior Court of Maine.118 The Superior Court granted Nader and
Camejo’s motion to intervene; counsel for all three parties – Melanson,
Nader/Camejo, and the Secretary of State – met an expedited briefing schedule,
followed by oral argument before the Superior Court on September 24, 2004.119
On September 27, 2004, Judge Studstrup of the Superior Court affirmed the
decision of the Secretary of State based on the evidence of record, the Hearing
Officer’s report, and the oral and written arguments of the parties.120
Judge Studstrup found that the testimony of Mr. Snowdeal sufficiently
defeated Melanson’s allegations concerning the Campaign’s use of a “fictitious”
elector.121 Finding the use of “John Noble Snowdeal,” as opposed to “J. Noble
Snowdeal” or “Joseph Noble Snowdeal,” on some of the petitions to be an
immaterial typographical error, Judge Studstrup cited to the “immaterial
irregularities provision” of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 3(1).122 Judge Studstrup found that:
[T]he analysis by the hearing officer, and particularly the lack of any evidence of
confusion by those signing or reviewing the petitions is persuasive. Mr. Snowdeal
is a living, breathing person who testified before the Hearing Officer, not a
fictitious would-be elector created to fool petition signers. Acceptance of the
petitions with the incorrect first name is appropriate, whether as a matter of
application of [the Immaterial Irregularities Statute] or as an exercise of the
123
Secretary’s discretion on questions of this type.

Judge Studstrup also affirmed the Secretary of State’s ruling on the second and
third challenges, which concerned the absence of consent and unenrollment forms
from the candidates. Judge Studstrup deferred to the Secretary of State’s
interpretation of the laws that it administers. He noted that “[h]istorically, the
Secretary has required that only the slate of electors file such consent and
unenrollment forms because technically it is the electors who are being elected, not
the actual candidates for the office of president and vice-president.”124 The
candidates were therefore not required to file consent and unenrollment forms, and
the fact that Mr. Camejo was a member of the Green Party in California did not
matter. Neither Camejo nor Nader were required to file the forms, so it did not

117. Id. at **1-3.
118. See Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *1.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at *2.
122. See id. This statutory provision states that “[i]mmaterial irregularities include, but are not
limited to, misspelling, inclusion or omission of initials and substitution of initials for given names.”
Further, such immaterial irregularities “shall not invalidate the name or signature if the identity of the
person named is clear to the public official charged with reviewing that document.” 21-A M.R.S.A. §
3(1) (2008 & Supp. 2012).
123. Melanson, 2004 WL 3196784, at *2 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at *3.
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matter that they weren’t, in fact, “unenrolled.”
Judge Studstrup also affirmed the Secretary of State’s ruling on the fourth
challenge – that the petitions supplied by the Secretary of State did not comply with
the petition requirements set forth in the election statutes. Here, Judge Studstrup
also deferred to the Secretary of State’s decisions interpreting the laws that it
administers, stating:125
For many years the Secretary has followed a practice that incorporates both the
petition form and the consent and certification, though two documents, as one
petition. . . . The Secretary’s interpretation of the statute provides the needed
information even if not on the front page. With the Secretary’s interpretation and
practice, information potential signers may wish [to see] is available to the curious.
At the same time, the candidate’s interest in getting on the ballot clearly outweighs
the interest of having all four certifications appear on the face of the petition, when
126
they are available elsewhere.

Undeterred, Melanson, the head of the Maine Democratic Party, appealed
Judge Studstrup’s decision concerning the fourth challenge.127 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine (Law Court) affirmed the Superior Court’s decision.128
Because the Superior Court was acting as an intermediate court of appeals, the Law
Court reviewed the decision of the Secretary of State directly for errors of law,
abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by the record.129 Per standard canons
of statutory construction, the Law Court, in construing the statute, attempted to
give effect to legislative intent by examining the plain meaning of the statutory
language.130 It concluded that the language of 21-A M.R.S.A. § 353 requiring
certification “on the petition” was ambiguous when read in conjunction with § 354,
which states that a petition “may contain as many separate papers as necessary.”131
Because the Law Court found the statute to be ambiguous, it reviewed whether the
Secretary of State’s construction was reasonable.132
The Law Court noted the mandate of title 21-A, that the “[t]he Secretary of
State may establish the form and content of all forms, lists, documents and records
required by or necessary to the efficient operation of this Title.”133 The Law Court
found that “[a]llowing the unenrollment certification forms and the circulating
petition forms to be collectively considered ‘the petition’ certainly supports the
efficient operation of the nomination process.”134 It also found the legislative
history of section 353 to show that “the existence of the certification, not its
location, is the primary purpose of the certification requirement.”135 The Law
Court rejected Melanson’s argument that the purpose of certification is to inform
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id.
Id.
See Melanson v. Sec’y of State, 2004 ME 127, ¶ 2, 861 A.2d 641.
See id.
See id. ¶ 7.
See id.
See id. ¶ 9 (quoting 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(1) (2008 & Supp. 2012)).
See id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 10 (quoting 21-A M.R.S.A. § 21 (1993)).
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
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the public of an elector candidate’s party status prior to the distribution of a
petition. It stated that “[t]he purpose of the certification is to aid the Secretary in
fulfilling his responsibilities in the election process by ensuring that any person
who may be placed on a ballot meets the statutory requirements.”136 The Law
Court concluded that “[t]he purpose of the certification, the legislative history, and
the Secretary of State’s authority to prescribe forms for all provisions of title 21-A
pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 21, convinces us that the Secretary’s interpretation of
the statute is both reasonable and warranted when reading the statute in context.”137
The court deferred to the reasoning of the Secretary of State in interpreting the
statute to permit the certification to appear on an approved form deemed to be part
of the petition.138
So, although Melanson issued an objection to the Report and Recommendation
of the Hearing Officer, appealed the decision of the Secretary of State, and
appealed the decision of the Superior Court, none of the four judicial bodies that
entertained her challenges found merit in any of them. In Maine, as in other states,
the private challenges, and the appeals of the decisions made on those challenges,
did not operate to keep unqualified candidates off of Maine’s ballot. To the
contrary, the challenge mechanisms were used to try to keep a qualified candidate
off of the ballot, and to tie up his resources. Nader became the target of these
challenges and appeals because he had enough support to put together a valid
nomination petition, not because there was any indication that he lacked the
requisite voter support. Candidates without any real support from voters, the
candidates whose petitions should be challenged, are unlikely to inspire a petition
challenge.
IV. ELECTION SLAPPS EVADE JUDICIAL SANCTION
A. The Campaign’s Lawsuits Against the DNC
Between October 2007 and November 2009, Nader filed four lawsuits seeking
redress for the Democratic Party’s use of frivolous lawsuits to sabotage his
campaign.139 Three of the lawsuits ultimately ended up before the D.C. Court of
Appeals and the last lawsuit was ultimately dismissed pursuant to an order from
Maine’s highest court, in the summer of 2013.140 The six-years of hard-fought
litigation, which never even led to a trial on the merits, show the futility of seeking
meaningful relief from Election SLAPPs brought during the three-month election
cycle.

136. Id. ¶ 12.
137. Id. ¶ 13.
138. Id.
139. See Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 09-7004, 2009 WL 4250599 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30,
2009); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 590 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 573, 66 A.3d
571.
140. Id.
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1. The D.C. Lawsuits
In the first of the lawsuits to come before the D.C. Court of Appeals, the court
declined to affirm the District Court’s dismissal under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, a body of law arguably designed to solve other problems.141 Instead, after
noting that the lawsuit “present[ed] interesting legal issues of first impression,”142
the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.143
Before affirming the dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, however, the
court acknowledged the difficulty a court would face in ruling on malicious
prosecution and abuse of process claims based on the facts of Nader’s case. The
court stated that the case would turn on Nader’s ability to prove a pattern of filings
that were objectively baseless and intentionally so, meaning that Nader would have
to show that the defendants filed the petition challenges knowing that they were
false.144 The court accepted Nader’s theory of special injury for both claims: that
the pattern of baseless litigation launched by the democrats deprived him “so
dramatically of resources that he was unable to meaningfully campaign for the
presidency.”145
The court interpreted Nader’s claim as an “aggregated,
conspiratorial theory of misuse of the judicial process.”146
Given that a few of the challenges succeeded, the court expressed concern over
whether the complaint alleged “a strategy of repeatedly filing deliberately false
claims.”147 The court explained that it would need to decide whether Nader must
prove that the Democrats’ overall strategy was itself objectively baseless or
whether it would be sufficient for Nader to show only that the Democrats’ strategy
resulted in more than one baseless suit.”148
The showing required by the court would also have choice of law implications.
If the court required plaintiffs to prove that the defendants’ overall strategy was
itself objectively baseless, D.C. law would apply.149 If the court only required
Nader to show that the defendants’ strategy resulted in more than one baseless suit,
choice of law issues would emerge:
[W]e would face the choice of law problem in marking the boundary between a
Democratic loss and a baseless lawsuit. . . [I]f each suit requires separate
consideration, we would face nineteen separate legal standards, each having at
least three inquiries: (1) What makes a valid ballot challenge in State X? (2)
What is State X’s law of probable cause for purposes of malicious prosecution?
and (3) Does State X have a special standard for, say, sending a letter to an
election commission or for election law issues in general? Almost all these legal
issues are questions of state law on which we lack instructive precedents. And this
150
list is hardly exhaustive.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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After outlining some of the issues that an analysis on the merits would raise,
the court took the less laborious approach of affirming the dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds.151 The court’s opinion gives an ominous warning about the
challenges that a plaintiff, and the court, would face in a suit that sought redress for
this particular brand of Election SLAPP. The D.C. Court of Appeals eventually
dismissed the remaining two suits before it on claim preclusion and res judicata
grounds.152
2. The Maine Lawsuit
After the dismissals of the D.C. lawsuits, Nader filed a new complaint in
Maine’s state court.153 The plaintiffs in this suit, Nader (as candidate), and
Christopher Droznick, Nancy Oden, and Rosemary Whittaker (his 2004 Maine
presidential electors), brought claims against the Maine Democratic Party, the
Democratic National Committee, Kerry-Edwards 2004, Inc., the Ballot Project,
Inc., Dorothy Melanson, Terry McAuliffe, and Toby Moffitt. The plaintiffs
brought claims of civil conspiracy, abuse of process and wrongful use of civil
proceedings (a tort in Maine similar to malicious prosecution) arising from the
alleged groundless and abusive litigation against the campaign during the 2004
presidential election.154 The plaintiffs alleged that the nomination petition
challenges, the subpoenas, the discovery requests, and the related appeals filed or
issued by defendants were baseless.155 The plaintiffs further alleged that the
coordinated onslaught of this baseless litigation was calculated to harass and
embarrass the candidates’ electors, and to obstruct and drain funds from the
candidates, thereby interfering with the candidates’ rights to run for public
office.156
Ironically, the Maine lawsuit was initially dismissed pursuant to Maine’s antiSLAPP statute – a statute intended to protect parties from frivolous lawsuits
157
designed to stifle political participation.
On appeal of the dismissal, however,
the highest court in Maine announced a change to the standard applied to the anti158
SLAPP statute and remanded the case.
The initial dismissal of Nader’s lawsuit
via Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute illuminated two burden-shifting mechanisms,
which courts had previously tacked on to the statute when they applied it, that
made the statute yield perverse results. The Law Court announced that it was
eliminating one of the burden-shifting mechanisms that rendered the statute
unconstitutional, but it left the other burden-shifting mechanism in place. It
remanded the case and directed the trial court to apply the new standard. It looked

151. Id. at 702.
152. Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 590 F. Supp. 2d 164, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Nader v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 09-7004, 2009 WL 4250599, *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2009).
153. Complaint, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cnty.,
Nov. 25, 2009)
154. Id.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 4.
157. See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-09-57 (Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cty., Nov. 15,
2010).
158. See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶¶ 36, 39, 41 A.3d 551.
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as though Nader was going to have his day in court.
The trial court applied the new standard and denied defendant’s attempts to
159
dismiss Nader’s suit via the anti-SLAPP statute.
On appeal of this decision,
however, the Law Court retreated from its initial opinion and directed the trial court
160
to dismiss Nader’s suit.
The second Law Court decision muddies the waters on
anti-SLAPP jurisprudence. Although its first opinion purports to announce a new
standard, its second opinion dictates an application of the “new” standard that
sounds much like the old unconstitutional application. Ultimately, Maine’s antiSLAPP statute was used to dismiss a lawsuit that sought redress for . . . SLAPPs.
V. MAINE’S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE
A. Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute states:
When a moving party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims or cross claims
against the moving party are based on the moving party’s exercise of the moving
party’s right of petition under the constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of Maine, the moving party may bring a special motion to dismiss.
The court shall advance the special motion so that it may be heard and determined
with as little delay as possible. The court shall grant the special motion, unless the
party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any
arguable basis in law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the
responding party. In making its determination, the court shall consider the
pleading and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the
161
liability or defense is based.

The trial court initially found that Nader’s claims were based on defendants’
exercise of their right of petition.162 The trial court then found that Nader failed to
show that the defendants’ challenges were “devoid of any reasonable factual
support or any arguable basis in law. . . .”163
When the defendants moved for attorneys’ fees, however, the trial court
awarded a fee of one dollar.164 The court acknowledged that Nader’s case was not
the “typical” SLAPP that the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to address.165 “The
character of this litigation brought, by a candidate for President of the United
States, against one of the two major political parties, is significantly different in
tone and tenor” from the typical SLAPP cases.166 The court reasoned:
This case does not pit a wealthy developer against a citizen of modest means . . .
This case involves a candidate for national elective office seeking to put forth his
159.
160.
161.
162.
2010).
163.
164.
165.
166.

Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 10, 66 A.3d 571.
Id. ¶ 26.
14 M.R.S.A. § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-09-57, at 10 (Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cty., Nov. 15,
Id. at 18-19 (quoting 14 M.R.S.A. § 556).
See id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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ideas to the national electorate for their consideration and approval and the
defendants alleged calculated efforts to interfere, discourage and impede public
exposure to that candidacy and those ideas. Those efforts are central to the
167
functioning of this democracy.

The court acknowledged the competing First Amendment rights at issue in the
case.168 Nader alleged that the defendants filed frivolous lawsuits to suppress his
political participation. The defendants were asking the court to toss out Nader’s
lawsuit because it infringed on their right to bring lawsuits.
In its opinion concerning attorneys’ fees, the court acknowledged that the
defendants’ request to dismiss Nader’s lawsuit pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP
lawsuit implicated competing rights of political association, effective voting, Equal
Protection, and petitioning. Although the court felt compelled by precedent to
dismiss the case, it flagged the underlying decision to dismiss the case as one that
shows how Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute can be applied to protect one party’s First
Amendment petitioning rights at the expense of the opposing party’s First
Amendment petitioning rights:
The broad interpretation and application of this statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556, by the
Law Court, compels the decision reached by this Court in its decision of
November 15th. However, this case involving Candidate Nader, raises significant
questions concerning the appropriate judicial interpretation of 14 M.R.S. § 556 in
the context of the Maine and Federal Constitutions and the competing interests
represented therein. Whether this Court’s decision of November 15th provides the
opportunity for that to happen is for others to decide. But for the impact of legal
authority in this State relating to 14 M.R.S. § 556, this Court is of the opinion that
Plaintiffs’ action warranted further analysis and development through the
evolution of normal civil litigation process. Defendants Ballot Project and Moffett
characterize Plaintiffs’ litigation as ‘meritless.’ With all due respect, the merits of
169
Plaintiffs’ underlying claims have yet to be evaluated.

So, although the trial court dismissed the suit, it awarded only a nominal one
dollar in attorney’s fees and wrote that binding precedent required it to reach this
unsettling result. In Nader’s case, Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute traded one litigant’s
right to petition for another litigant’s right to petition, without an examination of
the merits of any of the “petitions” at issue.
Both parties appealed the decision.
B. Apparent Change of Burdens on Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and
Remand to the Trial Court
On appeal, the Law Court announced a new standard for Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute and remanded the case to the trial court.170
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute involves two steps of analysis. In the first step,
the defendant, as movant on the special motion to dismiss, carries the initial burden
to show that the suit is based on activity that qualifies as an exercise of the
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
See Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶¶ 36, 39, 41 A.3d 551.
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defendant’s First Amendment right to petition the government (Step 1).171 If the
defendant carries this initial burden, then the statute applies and the burden shifts to
the plaintiff for step two of the analysis.172 To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff then
needs to show that the defendant’s petitioning activity: (1) was without “reasonable
factual support”; (2) was without an “arguable basis in law”; and (3) resulted in
“actual injury” to the plaintiff (Step 2).173 The plaintiff may make this showing
through affidavits and the pleadings.174
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute does not specify how a court determines whether
the parties have carried their respective burdens in Step 1 and Step 2.175 Before
Nader’s suit, courts would review the evidence in a light most favorable to the
movant – the defendant.176 As a result, if the parties presented conflicting facts, the
defendant would prevail and the case would be dismissed. The Law Court
recognized this “converse summary-judgment-like standard” as working in stark
contrast with other traditional dispositive motions, where conflicts are resolved in
favor of the nonmoving party.177
With motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, for example,
courts view pleadings and evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. If the movant fails to carry his burden, the case continues to discovery or
trial.178 Under the traditional model, the party moving to dispose of the case carries
the heavier burden. The Law Court also recognized the problem of viewing
evidence in favor of a moving party, when the evidence had not yet been subject to
discovery or trial. “Application of this standard becomes problematic when the
‘evidence’ to be viewed most favorably to the moving party is disputed and
consists only of pleadings and statements in affidavits not yet subject to discovery
or trial.”179 Recognizing the “converse summary-judgment-like standard” as a
“creature of case law,” the Law Court saw fit to change the standard.180
The Law Court established a new standard for analyzing whether a plaintiff
carries his burden at Step 2 of the analysis. Under the new standard, a plaintiff
must present prima facie evidence, and the court must infer that the allegations in
the plaintiff’s complaint and affidavits are true.181 The court described prima facie
evidence as proof of “enough evidence to allow a fact-finder to infer the fact at
issue and rule in the party’s favor.”182 The plaintiff must present “some evidence”
of every element.183 The court described this threshold as a “low standard that does

171. See Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 7, 942 A.2d 1226.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
175. See id.
176. See Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 18, 772 A.2d 842; Maietta Constr., Inc. v.
Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶ 8, 847 A.2d 1169.
177. See Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 30, 41 A.3d 551.
178. See id.
179. Id. ¶ 17.
180. Id. ¶ 31.
181. Id. ¶ 33.
182. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Cookson v. State, 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8, 17 A.3d 1208).
183. Id. ¶ 35 (quoting Cookson, 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8, 17 A.3d 1208).
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not depend on the reliability or credibility of evidence . . . .”184 Under this new
standard, the plaintiff would be able to avoid dismissal, “even when faced with
conflicting evidence from the defendant.”185
After establishing the new standard, the Law Court remanded Nader’s case to
the trial court.186 Applying the new standard, the trial court found that Nader made
a prima facie showing that the defendants’ petitioning activities were devoid of any
reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law, which would have allowed the
case to proceed to trial.187
Of course, the defendants appealed this decision, too.
C. Retreat to Unconstitutional Application of Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
In May of 2013, the Law Court took issue with the way the trial court applied
the newly-announced standard. The Court vacated the judgment of the trial court
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case under Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute.188
In its first opinion (Nader 1), the Court stated that Nader “should be allowed to
proceed” if he presented prima facie evidence that “any, rather than all” of
defendant’s petitioning activities were “devoid of any reasonable factual support or
arguable basis in law.”189 In its second opinion (Nader 2), the court glommed
together many of the petition challenges and characterized the underlying
petitioning activity as only “three discrete petitioning activities”: (1) Benjamin
Tucker’s complaint to the Secretary of State;190 (2) Melanson’s complaint to the
Secretary of State; and (3) Melanson’s appeals to the Superior Court and to the
Law Court.191
Instead of looking at Nader’s evidence that many of the individual challenges
to the nomination petition lacked support and a basis in law, the Law Court defined
“petitioning activity” as the group of challenges in a particular filing, and
determined that it would be satisfied if at least one of the individual challenges in a
filing had some arguable basis in law. This characterization is at odds with the
language of the anti-SLAPP statute itself, which defines “petitioning activity” to
include “any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative,
executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding.”192 “[A]ny
written . . . statement” should include any written statement in a court filing, even if
the written statement appears next to written statements that have a basis in law.
Under this framework, the court ignored evidence that many of the individual
challenges lacked support. Defining “petitioning activity” as the collective group
184. Id. (quoting Cookson, 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8, 17 A.3d 1208).
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 38.
187. Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 10, 66 A.3d 571.
188. Id. ¶ 26.
189. Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 36, 41 A.3d 551 (emphasis added).
190. According to Nader, Tucker is a registered Democrat in Maine, who filed a challenge to Nader’s
nomination petition at the direction of the DNC. See FN 87; see also Complaint ¶¶ 57-58, Nader v. Me.
Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super. Ct., Was. Cnty., Nov. 15, 2010).
191. Nader, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 17, 66 A. 3d 571.
192. 14 M.R.S.A. § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012).

216

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

of challenges, as opposed to each individual challenge, enabled the Law Court to,
essentially, apply the inverse standard of the one initially announced. Instead of
determining whether any of the challenges to the nomination petition were devoid
of support or a basis in law, the Court looked to see if any of the challenges had
support or a basis in law.193 The Law Court found that the challenge over the birth
name of one of Nader’s presidential electors (John Noble Snowdeal v. J. Noble
Snowdeal v. Joseph Noble Snowdeal) had a technical basis in law and that this
saved all of the petition challenges in Melanson’s complaint.194 It then found that
the appeal over the propriety of the signature petition forms, which were designed
by the Secretary of State, also had a technical basis in law.195 Without examining
the basis of the appeals of Melanson’s other three challenges, the Law Court found
that Melanson’s entire appeal had a basis in law.196 The process employed in
Nader 2 was a far cry from the standard announced in Nader 1. In terms of
guidance for future litigants, it seems that a technical legal basis for one claim will
validate a host of baseless claims, as long as the claims are part of the same
pleading.
Nader 2 also departs from the prima facie standard announced in Nader 1.
Nader 1 held that courts must “infer that the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint
and factual statements in any affidavits responding to a special motion to dismiss
are true.”197 But in Nader 2, the Law Court ignores much evidence, and primarily
addresses evidence that it finds insufficient. For example, on the issue of whether
the Democratic Party was behind the Tucker complaint, Nader pointed out that 1)
an exhibit to the Tucker complaint is a letter from a California elections official to
one of the attorneys who filed the Democratic Party’s Pennsylvania challenge; 2)
the organization of another one of the named defendants paid this attorney’s firm
for the costs associated with that challenge; and 3) the Democratic Party retained
the other law firm that filed the challenge.198 One would think that this would
satisfy the definition of prima facie evidence set forth in Nader 1:
[P]roof only of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and
rule in the party’s favor. . . . [O]nly some evidence on every element of proof
necessary to obtain the desired remedy. . . . [P]rima facie proof is a low standard
that does not depend on the reliability or credibility of the evidence, all of which
199
may be considered at some later time in the process.

But, Nader 2 does not discuss this evidence. Instead, it picks out other evidence
that Nader did not present, and states that other averments made “on information
and belief” do not satisfy the burden of producing prima facie evidence.200
Although the Law Court announced a “new standard” in Nader 1, its
193. Nader, 2013 ME 51, ¶¶ 21, 24, 66 A.3d 571.
194. Id. ¶ 21.
195. Id. ¶ 24.
196. Id.
197. Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 33, 41 A.3d 551.
198. Complaint ¶¶ 58, 120-21, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super.
Ct., Was. Cnty., Nov. 25, 2009)
199. Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 34, 41 A.3d 551 (quoting Cookson, 2011 ME 53, ¶ 8, 17 A.3d 1208).
200. Nader, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 19, 66 A. 3d 571 (quoting Complaint ¶ 30, Nader, 2012 ME 57, 41 A.3d
551).
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instructions for applying the “new standard” in Nader 2 undermine the initial
message and leave a murky precedent.
D. Eliminating Both Burden-Shifting Mechanisms from
Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
Aside from the mixed messages about Step 2 of the analysis for Maine’s antiSLAPP statute, neither of the Law Court’s opinions address the weird standard
courts have been applying in Step 1 of the analysis.
Now, courts must infer that the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and
affidavits are true for Step 2, but courts should also make this inference in Step 1,
when the court needs to decide whether the suit is based on activity that qualifies as
an exercise of the defendant’s First Amendment right to petition the government.
Even though Nader alleged that the defendants initiated challenges and
appeals, and issued subpoenas and other discovery, which were devoid of factual
support or an arguable basis in law, the court found that the defendants’ activity
was protected by the First Amendment and that the anti-SLAPP statute applied.201
Because at Step 1 the courts in Maine look to the general underlying action of the
complaint (litigation), as opposed to what is more specifically pled (frivolous
litigation), the anti-SLAPP statute will apply to all abuse of process and wrongful
use of civil procedure claims.
Accordingly, all plaintiffs bringing these claims will be subjected to the
heightened standards of Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. Even under the revised
standard at Step 2, the statute creates extra burdens on plaintiffs. Without the aid
of discovery, plaintiffs bringing these claims will have to come forward with prima
facia evidence that the defendant engaged in litigation that (1) was without
“reasonable factual support”; (2) was without an “arguable basis in law”; and (3)
resulted in “actual injury” to the plaintiff.202 To the extent that this prima facia
evidence standard is higher than the notice pleading standard applicable to all other
claims made under Maine law, Maine has now set a different pleading standard for
certain torts.203 And, according to Nader II, the prima facia standard applied in
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute far exceeds the notice pleading standard applied to all
other torts, under any other statutes.
It also follows that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute imposes additional elements to
claims for abuse of process. As discussed above, all abuse of process claims will
be subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because at the base of all of these claims is a
process or petition that Maine courts give First Amendment protection to,
regardless of whether the complaint alleges the abuse of the process or the
baselessness of the petition.204
Under Maine law, two elements are required to sustain a claim for abuse of
process: (1) “the use of process in a manner improper in the regular conduct of the
201. See Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 28, 41 A.3d 551.
202. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012)
203. Cf. Me. R. Civ. P. 8 (setting forth the pleading standard for claims brought under Maine law).
Maine’s Rule 8 calls for "(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief which the pleader seeks." Id.
204. See Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 28, 41 A.3d 551.

218

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

proceeding,” and (2) “the existence of an ulterior motive.”205 At Step 2 of the
analysis in motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, the
plaintiff must come forward with prima facia evidence that the defendant engaged
in litigation that (1) was without “reasonable factual support;” (2) was without an
“arguable basis in law;” and (3) resulted in “actual injury” to the plaintiff.206
Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing an abuse of process claim will be required to
present prima facie evidence of elements wholly separate and apart from the
elements that constitute his claim. Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute imposes these extra
elements, and then requires a plaintiff to present evidence of them without the aid
of discovery.
Although the Law Court recognized that the “converse summary-judgmentlike standard” in play with the anti-SLAPP statute ran contrary to the standards
applicable to other dispositive motions, the Law Court only changed the standard
applied to Step 2 of the analysis. As for Step 1 of the analysis, when the defendant
is required to show that the suit is based on activity that receives protection from
the First Amendment, the evidence is still viewed in a light most favorable to the
moving party – the defendant. The court is not necessarily accepting the truth of
the plaintiff’s allegations, even though the anti-SLAPP statute is a vehicle for
dismissal. When the parties present conflicting facts (e.g. the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant’s litigation was baseless and the defendant submits an affidavit
stating that it was not), the defendant prevails and the statute applies. The analysis
then moves to Step 2.
The court should view the pleadings and evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party (the plaintiff) at Step 1 as well as at Step 2. Without the aid
of discovery, the defendant is in a much better position to come forth with evidence
that it had probable cause for bringing its litigation. The party bringing the
underlying petition shouldn’t even need discovery to show that its petitioning was
premised on “reasonable factual support” and an “arguable basis in law.” The
initiator of litigation is in a better position to show probable cause for the litigation,
so it should not also receive a beneficial standard on this issue. Further, as
recognized by the Law Court in the context of Step 2, courts traditionally view
evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party in dispositive motions.207
The Law Court made some corrective measures to how Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute is applied, but it should change the way courts view the pleadings and
evidence in Step 1, as well as Step 2 of the statute. Suits seeking redress for
SLAPPs, which typically take the form of claims for abuse of process or malicious
prosecution, as well as other types of malicious prosecution and abuse of process
claims, are now subjected to heightened pleading standards. The anti-SLAPP
statute also imposes an extra element to abuse of process claims. Ironically, suits
actually seeking redress for SLAPPs will be subjected to the heightened pleading
205. See Advanced Const. Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, ¶ 23, 901 A.2d 189 (internal citation
omitted). “The filing of a lawsuit qualifies as a regular use of process and cannot constitute abuse of
process, even if the filing was influenced by an ulterior motive. Instead, abuse of process claims arise
when litigants misuse individual legal procedures, such as discovery, subpoenas, and attachment, after a
lawsuit has been filed.” Id.
206. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012).
207. See Nader, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 30, 41 A.3d 551.
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standards of Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute.
VI. ELIMINATION OF PRIVATE CHALLENGES TO NOMINATION PETITIONS
Moving back to the root of Election SLAPPs, here are the problems with
allowing private challenges to nomination petitions: 1) While the nomination
petition system is designed to only allow candidates with a prerequisite amount of
voter support to appear on the ballot, only those candidates who actually have that
support (and therefore pose a threat to an opponent), will actually draw petition
challenges (in other words, the challenges are not likely to be used for their
intended purpose); 2) No one will challenge the nomination petitions of those most
likely to lack the requisite voter support; 3) The task of responding to petition
challenges and appeals exponentially increases the burden an independent
candidate faces when trying to get on a state’s ballot; 4) The task of responding to
petition challenges and appeals on a state-by-state basis in a federal election further
compounds this burden, and the burden is not likely accounted for when state
legislators assess the burden of compliance with their state’s nomination petition
requirements.
A true analysis of the burden imposed on an independent presidential
candidate seeking ballot access needs to incorporate the burdens of complying with
the ballot access restrictions and validation procedures of 51 different territories.
Examined under this framework, the piece-meal nature of the federalist electoral
process, plus the availability of private challenges to nomination petitions, creates
an undue burden on independent candidates. An independent candidate could face
limitless and simultaneous petition challenges, and appeals, in far-flung forums
across the country, all during a compressed and time-sensitive period in the
campaign cycle.208 Nader’s 2004 experience shows the reality of this undue
burden. The coordinated challenges issued by the DNC against the Campaign’s
nomination petitions in 19 different forums were effective in diluting the
Campaign’s force during a critical time in the election cycle, even though the
overwhelming majority of the challenges and appeals failed on their merits.209
The judicial contours of Nader’s lawsuits against the DNC for its use/abuse of
the challenge process show how such behavior is not easily sanctioned by filing a
lawsuit. Existing case law does not provide ready answers to the questions
presented by Nader’s case. Can a slew of claims, some with merit, most without,
constitute an abuse of process claim?210 Would Nader have to “prove that the
Democrats’ overall strategy was itself objectively baseless,” or would it be
sufficient for Nader to “show only that the Democrats’ strategy resulted in more
than one baseless suit”?211 The courts presented with Nader’s case have not yet
answered these questions, but they loom large.
The courts presented with Nader’s claims did acknowledge the complex
208. See generally, AMATO, supra note 14.
209. See Complaint ¶ 136, Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, WASSC-CV-2009-57 (Me. Super. Ct.,
Was. Cnty., Nov. 15, 2010).
210. See Transcript of Oral Argument 34-40, Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).
211. Nader, 567 F.3d at 699.
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analysis demanded by the claims. Jurisdictional issues could arise if a judge in one
territory was asked to make determinations concerning cases tried and decided by
different judges in different forums.212 Choice of law issues would abound if a
judge was asked to distinguish between a lost challenge and a baseless challenge.213
If each challenge required separate consideration, a judge would face a separate
legal standard for each forum and would have to determine:
(1) what makes a valid ballot challenge in State X? (2) What is State X’s law of
probable cause for purposes of malicious prosecution? and (3) Does State X have a
special standard for . . . sending a letter to an election commission or for election
214
law issues in general?

When faced with Nader’s case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
acknowledged this trying analysis and noted that “the merits of Nader’s claims
present state law issues of first impression.” Rather than tackling this analysis, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds.215
Finally, judicial recourse after-the-fact is cold comfort to a candidate who was
denied the ability to fully participate in an election. Post-election judicial redress
could not provide an independent candidate with another shot at the election.
Judicial redress in the middle of the fray would not necessarily alleviate the burden
imposed by the frivolous challenges. Because of the burden imposed on a
candidate in defending the nation-wide petitions, it is unlikely the campaign would
have the resources to bring individual malicious prosecution counterclaims or Rule
11 motions during the course of the actual challenges or that such claims would be
resolved in time to matter. Even if it did, engaging in additional litigation during
the time sensitive campaign period would exacerbate the underlying problem of
being entangled in litigation in the first place.
Coordinated, aggregated challenges to nomination petitions are an effective
way to handicap a campaign in a way not envisioned by the individual challenge
procedures themselves. Under the existing system, private parties can coordinate
and aggregate their challenges in a way that perverts the purpose of the individual
challenge mechanisms. Aggregated challenges do not identify ineligible candidates
and then keep them off of state ballots; aggregated challenges create an undue
burden that prevents ineligible and eligible candidates alike from appearing on state
ballots. Instead of relying on private, partisan enforcement, states should audit the
nomination petitions using a universally applied, neutral, predetermined process,
such as statistical sampling. State audits would eliminate the uneven enforcement
created by the private challenge systems in place in most states. They would create
a neutral validation system that would apply evenly to all independent candidates,
not just those targeted by opponents. The criteria and methods for the statistical
sampling should be set forth in advance and allow some measure of predictability
for independent candidates seeking to comply with the signature requirements. The
audits should be final, thus eliminating the use of appeals by a well-funded private
party to prolong the validation procedure.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Nader’s 2004 plight shows how coordinated ballot challenges can cripple a
campaign. The current system allows private parties to create undue procedural
burdens to ballot access by aggregating petition challenges. This use of petition
challenges does not advance the states’ interests of: 1) keeping ineligible
candidates off of the ballot; or 2) eliminating voter confusion. In fact, only serious
candidates who threaten another candidate are likely to inspire petition challenges.
Eliminating the availability of private challenges to nomination petitions would
create a less partisan validation system. And, the private challenge mechanism
could be replaced by state audits, which would result in a more even enforcement
of a state’s nomination petition requirements.
Nader’s 2004 plight shows how there is no safeguard against the use of
concerted frivolous lawsuits to manipulate the election process, as long as private
challenges remain available. Nader’s post-election lawsuits show the difficulty in
obtaining post-election legal redress. Nader’s post-election lawsuit in Maine has
led to at least a surface-level adjustment to the way courts apply Maine’s antiSLAPP statute, but the Law Court’s most recent order allows a singular
nonfrivolous petition to protect frivolous petitions in the same filing from sanction,
and continues to impose extra burdens on a particular class of litigants – those most
likely to be seeking redress for SLAPPs or for other malicious uses of prosecution.

